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ABSTRACT 
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By  
 
Buyankhishig Khulan 
 
 
Notwithstanding considerable efforts in reforming the financial sector, many 
transition economies still face a number of challenges. These include strengthening 
legal and regulatory framework, encouraging competition among financial institutions 
and deepening financial markets. Financial markets in many transition economies are 
fragile and often lack ability to satisfactorily perform their economic functions. In this 
regard Mongolia, a landlocked country with its 2.5 million people and sandwiched 
between Russia and China, has taken steps towards sweeping reforms in its economy 
since 1990. The lessons from experience of other transition economies indicate that 
Mongolia’s experience may replicate that of other transition economies that 
liberalized their financial sectors too rapidly and before the pre-conditions for a 
successful liberalization had been attained. In Mongolia’s case it also appears that the 
rapid liberalization of the financial sector may have benefited the economy but it also 
been costly given the weaknesses in basic infrastructure, such as banking skills, poor 
rules of disclosure, and weak accounting and auditing standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Notwithstanding considerable efforts in reforming the financial sector, many 
transition economies still face a number of challenges. These include strengthening 
legal and regulatory framework, encouraging competition among financial institutions 
and deepening financial markets. Financial markets in many transition economies are 
fragile and often lack ability to satisfactorily perform their economic functions.  
Mongolia, a landlocked country with its 2.5 million people and sandwiched between 
Russia and China, has taken steps towards sweeping reforms in its economy since 
early 1990s. The financial sector reform was a key component of Mongolia’s 
economic transformation toward a market-based economy.  Until 1990 the Mongolian 
economy was based on a centrally planned model that had been adopted more than six 
decades ago. The financial sector was characterized by mono-banking. The State 
Bank of Mongolia was responsible for the regulation of the note circulation and 
handling of foreign exchange, including international reserves. At the same time the 
State Bank was the sole source of credit and served as the fiscal agent of the 
Government by collecting and disbursing revenue to support government and public 
enterprise activity. Mobilization and allocation of resources were determined by the 
central plan. Money and capital markets as well as non-bank financial intermediaries 
were virtually nonexistent. The picture changed when Mongolia started its transition 
to a market-oriented economy in 1990. As a main condition to secure smooth 
transformation from centrally planned economy to a new market-oriented one and to 
restore economic growth, the concept of an efficient, well-functioning financial 
system has become more important. With help of international financial institutions, 
Mongolia took steps to reform its financial system, as a result a two-tiered banking 
system was introduced; 5 commercial banks were established; supervisory power over 
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financial intermediaries and greater autonomy was given to the Bank of Mongolia /the 
former State Bank of Mongolia/ under the Banking Act, which became effective from 
May 1991; the Mongolia Stock Exchange was also established.  
Mongolia’s financial sector development has received relatively limited attention in 
the past in the literature on financial reforms of transition economies. Although more 
than a decade passed since the wide-range reform program was put in place, 
Mongolia’s financial sector has still a long way to go to achieve a truly market-
oriented system that is more efficient and more stable. The main purpose of this paper 
is to examine the financial sector reforms carried out in Mongolia over the past ten 
years by identifying implications of the reform actions and comparing the results vis-
à-vis other transition economies. The focus is given primarily on the banking sector 
development. The paper reviews the initial macroeconomic as well as financial 
situation at the early stages of Mongolia’s transition to a market economy, describes 
the specific financial sector reform actions undertaken, their effects on monetary 
control, and the efficiency of financial intermediation and attempts to summarize the 
main lessons of the reforms. The organization of the paper is as follows. Chapter I 
provides a conceptual framework for the financial sector reforms, related issues, 
including sequencing and prerequisites for successful financial reforms. Chapter II 
reviews initial conditions in relation to both general economy and the financial sector. 
Chapter III takes a close look at the reforms in the financial sector through analyzing 
three different stages of financial sector development in Mongolia. The general 
lessons from the reform experiences are summarized at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter IV compares the reform efforts in other transition economies, namely CIS 
and CEE countries with that in Mongolia. Approaches taken in reforming the 
financial sectors in these countries are discussed and respective lessons are derived. 
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Concluding remarks contain a summary of main findings and suggestions and key 
policy issues that need to be addressed in the near future.  
 
CHAPTER ONE. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Understanding Financial Liberalization 
Financial sector liberalization is viewed as a set of operational reforms and policy 
measures designed to deregulate and transform the financial system and its structure 
with view to achieving a liberalized market oriented system within an appropriate 
regulatory framework.1 The basic premise of financial reform is that government 
intervention should not prevent market signals from directing the allocation of 
resources. Voluntary, market-based decision-making is facilitated by an efficient 
financial system. Until the 1980s, however, the development and efficiency of 
financial systems were severely undermined by government efforts to promote 
economic development through interest rate controls, directed and subsidized credit 
programs, and heavy fiscal burdens. The result was more distorted financial sectors, 
sub-optimal saving rates, and misallocation of investment. Empirical research shows a 
negative correlation between financial repression and the real rate of growth. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have argued that a regime of financial repression, 
involving such policies as government controls on interest rates, or direct controls on 
credit allocation, tends to retard financial development and economic growth. King 
and Levine (1993) have tested the hypothesis that financial deepening induces growth 
using data on 80 countries over the period 1968-1990. They showed that various 
measures of financial development are strongly associated with real per capita GDP 
growth, the rate of physical capital accumulation, and improvements in the efficiency 
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in which economies employ physical capital. They also show that financial 
development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, physical capital 
accumulation and economic efficiency improvements.  
In a modern economy, an efficient financial system is essential to facilitate economic 
transactions and specialization in production. A stable currency and an efficient 
payment system reduce uncertainty and costs of economic transactions. Financial 
assets with the full range of yield, liquidity and risk characteristics encourage savings 
in financial forms. Access to a variety of financial instruments enables economic 
agents to pool, price and exchange risks. A more robust and balanced financial system 
thus contributes to growth and stability of the economy. By achieving and sustaining 
macroeconomic stability and by building better rule-based supervisory and regulatory 
systems, governments can lay the foundations for smoothly functioning financial 
systems. The objective of financial sector reform therefore has been to address these 
issues and thereby to enhance the role of the financial sector in the development of the 
economy. The development of the financial sector is intimately related to the 
development of the whole economy. At the same time, instability in the macro 
economy usually reverberates into the financial sector and vice versa. The 
contribution of finance to growth is best seen, however, in terms of an efficient and 
adaptable payments system (in order to have a reliable means of payment) and in 
terms of savings mobilization and resource pooling. 
2. Sequencing the Reform 
Financial reforms carry risks if they are sequenced inappropriately and insufficiently 
supported, and the academic literature on sequencing has tended to place financial 
sector reforms relatively late in the overall sequencing of reforms and to favor a 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Editors R. Barry Johnston, V.Sundarajan, 1999. Sequencing Financial Sector Reforms  
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gradualist approach. But if one takes into account the cost of maintaining the controls 
on the financial sector – in terms of low savings mobilization, capital flight, lack of 
monetary control, and an efficient allocation of resources – together with benefits for 
stabilization, economic growth and efficiency of successful reforms, then a strategy of 
more rapid financial sector reform could be desirable in terms of achieving better 
economic performance. However, the literature suggests broad propositions on the 
optimal sequencing of economic reforms, including that: (1) macroeconomic 
stabilization is a prerequisite to structural reforms; (2) the liberalization of domestic 
financial markets should precede the removal of controls on international capital 
flows; (3) trade and real sector reforms should precede capital account liberalization. 
In general, macroeconomic stability and reasonably sound banks are viewed as 
prerequisites for successful financial sector reforms. 
CHAPTER TWO. THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT  
1. General economic environment  
Initial conditions 
In July 1990, immediately after the first multi-party elections, the Mongolian 
government launched far-reaching reforms aimed at creating a market-based economy. 
At the same time, Mongolia suffered three acute external shocks: an aid shock, a trade 
shock and a macro-economic shock. Financial assistance from the Soviet Union was 
reduced from 1.233 million USD in 1989 to zero in 1991. This aid shock, which is 
estimated to have been equivalent to as much as 30 per cent of the GDP, had a 
dramatic effect on the external accounts as well as on the government budget. The aid 
shock was made worse by a severe trade shock. Until 1990 approximately 90 per cent 
of Mongolia's external trade was with the Soviet Bloc countries, primarily the Soviet 
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Union. The implosion of the Soviet Union caused a near collapse of the trade. The 
problem was aggravated by the centrally planned nature of trade, which had resulted 
in a lack of horizontal contacts between trading enterprises. The combined effect of 
these two factors was a fall in imports from 963.0 million USD in 1989 to 374.5 
million USD in 1993. Exports, too, fell, albeit less dramatically, from 721.5 million 
USD to 365.8 million USD in the same period. The macro-economic shock was a 
combination of several factors: a macro-economic crisis resulting from the aid and 
trade shocks and an acute lack of economic expertise in the country. In the past Soviet 
advisers had provided much of the economic expertise, which, in any case, was 
woefully inadequate for dealing with macro-economic management problems in the 
context of a market economy. The introduction of world market prices created a 
fourth shock with severe long-term implications for the economy. The structure of the 
entire economy as well as the choice of production technology in all fields had been 
based on the assumption of unlimited supply of virtually free energy. Thus, 
enterprises not only lost their markets, but their production technology was overnight 
rendered hopelessly uneconomic. With strong support from donors the Government 
launched an ambitious program to complete the transition to a private sector-led 
market economy, accelerate economic growth, and reduce poverty. Financial sector 
restructuring and modernization were components of the program, which also 
included measures to reduce inflation; liberalize input and output prices; rationalize 
the tax regime; downsize the state; create a legal and institutional framework 
conducive to private sector development; and establish a safety net for the poor. The 
first few years of the 1990s were characterized by considerable economic turmoil. 
Consumer prices averaged 187 percent between 1991 and 1993, with an inflation peak 
of 325.5 percent in 1992. During the same period real GDP fell by approximately 20 
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percent. The economy turned around in 1993/94 as GDP began to grow again at a 
steady although not very high rate. By 1996 GDP was almost back at its 1989 level, 
although in per capita terms it was still some 44 per cent below the 1990 level. (Table 
1)  
Figure 1. Mongolia: Gross Domestic Product, 1981-1996 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy of Mongolia 
 
Other economic indicators, too, improved substantially. Inflation was gradually 
brought down from 66.3 per cent in 1994 to 6 per cent in 1998. The collapse of the 
external trade was halted and both exports and imports began gradually to increase 
again. The improvement in the foreign trade was intimately linked to an impressive 
re-orientation of the trade pattern. By 1998 Russia accounted for only 12 per cent of 
the exports and 31 percent of the imports, while China, Switzerland, Japan and South 
Korea had emerged as major trading partners. A sharp increase hit the trade deficit in 
1998, due to a drastic decline in copper prices, did not alter the positive picture with 
regard to trade but underscored the vulnerability of the external sector to price 
fluctuations of key raw materials.  
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                   Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators 1990-2003 /in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated/ 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Real GDP growth (%) -2.5 -9.2 -9.5 -3.0 2.3 6.3 2.4 4.0 3.5 3.2 1.1 1.0 4.0 5.5 
         Industry (%) 0.3 -12.5 -9.7 -6.4 1.7 17.4 -2.0 -3.3 4.2 1.1 2.7 16.5 4.7 0.5 
        Agriculture (%) -1.3 -4.4 -2.1 -2.7 2.7 9.5 4.7 4.3 6.4 4.2 -14.9 -18.5 -10.7 4.5 
Consumption  92.0 90.9 76.1 87.6 88.7 78.2 72.7 68.5 79.8 85.6 83.6 83.1  - -  
        Private 62.2 65.8 57.3 61.0 60.4 63.0 57.8 56.1 63.3 68.6 66.3 62.6  -  - 
       Government 29.8 25.1 18.8 26.6 28.3 15.1 14.9 12.4 16.5 17.0 17.3 20.5  - -  
CPI (annual % change; 
end of period) 
 - 52.7 325.5 183.0 66.3 53.1 44.6 20.5 6.0 10.0 8.1 8.0 1.6 4.7 
Total revenue and 
grants  
50.9 38.1 26.6 34.7 31.0 26.3 25.2 26.7 29.4 28.8 34.4 39.4 38.4 40.7 
Total expenditure and 
net lending 
94.2 70.3 40.2 52.5 44.2 31.5 32.7 34.5 41.9 39.4 42.1 43.9 44.4 45.2 
Current budget balance -8.8 -13.3 -1.7 5.9 3.2 6.2 4.0 1.6 -0.7 -0.3 3.1 5.7 4.4 8.1 
Overall budget balance -43.3 -32.2 -13.5 -17.7 -13.3 -5.2 -7.5 -7.8 -12.5 -10.6 -7.7 -4.5 -6.0 -4.5 
Export (in millions of 
USD) 
660.7 346.5 355.8 365.8 367.0 537.4 475.8 568.5 462.3 454.3 535.8 521.5 524.0 615.9 
Import (in millions of 
USD) 
924.0 486.5 418.4 374.5 374.9 488.9 510.8 503.4 582.4 567.3 614.5 637.7 690.7 801.0 
 Trade balance 
 (in millions of US $) 
-263.3 -140.0 -62.6 -8.7 -7.9 48.5 -35.0 65.1 -120.1 -113.0 -78.7 -116.2 -166.7 -185.1
GDP (in millions of 
USD) 
1902.7 145.5 144.6 532.8 690.4 1218.3 1159.2 1049.0 971.5 905.6 946.6 1016.3 1117.5 1188.4
Population (thous. 
persons) 
2149.3 2187.2 2215.0 2250.0 2280.0 2293.7 2329.9 2311.3 2344.5 2359.0 2390.5 2425.5 2458.9 2489.7
GDP per capita (USD) 885.3 66.5 65.3 236.8 302.8 531.2 497.5 453.9 414.4 383.9 396.0 419.0 454.5 477.3 
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Figure 2. Mongolia: Foreign Trade Balance, 1992-1999 (in millions USD) 
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Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy of Mongolia 
 
The fiscal sector, too, has by and large developed satisfactorily. However, in the early 
stages of transition the fiscal deficit soared high reaching 35.4 percent in 1990. But it 
averaged around 16 percent during 1991-1994. In later years it has been kept within 
manageable proportions, except in 1998 when a mini-crisis due to the fall in copper 
prices affected the budget. (Table 1) 
Figure 3. Mongolia: Fiscal Balance, 1990-1994 
      
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy of Mongolia 
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despite the progressive shrinkage of activities that dominated the economy under the 
old regime. Following the initial transition period, when the output plummeted, 
Mongolia achieved a sustained recovery during 1994-1999, with real GDP growth 
averaging 3.4 percent, exceeding the 0.8 percent population growth rate.  
2. Financial Sector Situation  
Initial conditions 
Prior to 1991, when Mongolia’s transformation from a centrally planned to a market-
based economy was initiated, the financial sector operated under the monobank 
system administered by the State Bank. Under the Council of the Ministers’ decrees 
of 1954, the State Bank was empowered to carry out both central banking functions 
including the issuance of currency, the management of official foreign exchange, and 
the provision of credit according to the annual credit plan developed in line with the 
annual production plan. Commercial banking operations were undertaken by 21 
branches of the State Bank and their 19 regional divisions, 164 subdivisions, and 260 
savings institutions (teller unit). These regional divisions and units provided full 
banking services, which included accepting deposits, extending credit, and executing 
orderly settlements of payments among economic agents.  
Access to bank credit was restricted to enterprises in production sector and to a few 
enterprises in the service sector; government and budgetary entities were not 
permitted to use bank credit directly. The aggregate amount of credit to be extended 
was centrally determined, and the State Bank allocated global amounts among its 
regional branches, which were in turn, distributed by branch managers to enterprises. 
All credit was extended without collateral, partly reflecting the lack of a legal 
framework for property transfer. Bank credit comprised two categories: short-term 
and long-term mainly for capital investment; short-term credit was available only to 
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state enterprises and cooperatives primarily to meet seasonal liquidity needs; no short-
term credit was extended to the household sector, which was, however, permitted to 
borrow long-term loans. Deposits offered by the State Bank consisted of three broad 
types: current accounts, savings account, and foreign currency deposits. Until 1989, 
current accounts with checking facilities were available only to the general 
government and economic entities in production sector, but subsequently began to be 
held as well by private cooperatives. Savings deposits were available only to 
households, while foreign currency deposits were held mainly by Mongolian foreign 
trading companies.   
Monetary policy was framed by the Council of Ministers, of which the Chairman of 
the State Bank was a member, and the State Bank implemented decisions on monetary 
policy in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. Monetary policy was generally 
passive, as the banking system’s role was to allocate credit according to an annual 
credit plan so as to ensure the attainment of output and investment objectives. 
Liquidity and credit were regulated solely through administrative control and 
quantitative limits. Consequently, interest rates were seldom adjusted and were kept 
low (2-4 percent per annum, with loan rates generally below deposit rates), although 
they tended to be positive in real terms reflecting the virtual nonexistence of inflation.  
Credit expansion was generally modest prior to 1991, as the credit plan was 
elaborated taking into account the expected mobilization of deposits. Despite signs of 
acceleration in 1990, domestic credit growth averaged 7 percent per year during 1988-
90. (Table 2) At the end of 1990, domestic credit stood at MNT 6.6 billion, of which 
credit to non-banks (public enterprises and private sector) amounted to MNT 8 billion 
as the government’s net position with the banking system registered a surplus. Among 
non-banks, public enterprises were predominant borrowers, accounting for 94 percent 
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of total credit; about 70 percent of credit extended to non-banks represented short-
term credit. Reflecting the limited expansion in domestic credit, the growth of broad 
money was also fairly moderate, averaging about 14 percent during 1988-90. Of the 
total outstanding of broad money at the end of 1990, narrow money accounted for 85 
percent.     
Table 2.Mongolia: Monetary Survey, 1988-1990 
1988 1989 1990 
                                                             (in millions of MNT, end of period) 
 Net international reserves 290 308 270 
   
Other foreign assets (net) -251 -41 -364 
  
Net domestic assets 4735 4821 6552 
    Domestic credit 5786 5903 6574 
        Net credit to government -2209 -2050 -1454 
        Credit to non-banks  7995 7953 8028 
            Public enterprises (7606) (7562) (7550) 
            Private sector (389) (391) (478) 
    Other items net -1051 -1082 -22 
  
Broad money 4774 5083 6458 
    Narrow money 3022 3505 4750 
         Currency in circulation 526 577 737 
         Demand deposits 2496 2929 4013 
               Public enterprises (2117) (2518) (3439) 
               Private sector (384) (411) (573) 
   Quasi-money 1753 1578 1708 
         Time/savings deposits (1585) (1478) (1557) 
         Foreign currency deposits (168) (100) (151) 
  
 (annual percentage change) 
Domestic credit 6.5 2.0 11.3 
    Credit to government 9.1 7.2 29.1 
    Credit to non-banks 1.7 -0.5 0.9 
              Public enterprises 0.6 -0.6 0.2 
              Private sector 27.1 0.5 22.3 
  
Broad money 9.1 6.5 27.1 
    Narrow money 6.6 16.0 35.5 
         Currency in circulation 7.4 9.7 27.7 
         Demand deposits 6.4 17.4 37.0 
   Quasi-money 13.9 -10.0 8.2 
 
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
 
The initial conditions for financial sector reforms are summarized in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Mongolia: Summary of Pre-reform Situation 
 Mongolia 
Macroeconomic situation  
     Fiscal situation Serious difficulties 
     Monetary situation Non market system; high inflation 
     Exchange rate system Controlled rates 
     External debt Heavily indebted 
Structural situation  
     Price system Comprehensive controls 
     Regulatory system Central planning system 
     Tax system Undeveloped 
     Trade system State trading 
     Exchange controls  
• Current account Controlled system 
• Capital account Controlled system 
     Financial sector  
• Interest rate controls Comprehensive 
• Public ownership Total 
• Central bank independence None 
• Indirect instruments Not developed 
• Money market Non-existent 
• Prudential regulation Undeveloped  
• Bank supervision Undeveloped 
  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE. FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS 
Financial sector reforms are expected to produce certain desirable effects, some of 
which are specific to the financial sector and can be mainly or exclusively attributed 
to these reforms, whereas others are more macroeconomic in nature and can not be 
easily disentangled from the effects of overall macroeconomic policies and structural 
reforms. The more direct financial sector reforms (accompanied by appropriate 
monetary policies) can be judged on the basis of some indicators including the 
reduction of monetary expansion and inflation, the maintenance of positive real 
interest rates, the increase in financial deepening, the growth of credit to the private 
sector in real terms, decline in normal interest rate spreads, and reduction in operating 
costs. The following four indicators were chosen in the case of Mongolia to assess the 
financial sector performance at different stages of its development: (i) financial 
deepening, measured by the ratio of M2/GDP, which shows the size of the formal 
 14
 
financial intermediary sector relative to economic activity, (ii) amount of cash outside 
banks to money supply (iii) total loans made by the banking system to GDP; and (iv) 
total time deposits of the banking system to GDP. 
Table 4. Mongolia: Main indicators of financial intermediation, 1991-2003 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
M2/GDP % 52.4 27.6 21.9 23.7 18.5 19.9 20.4 
Cash outside banks/ M2 % 17.1 14.1 20.5 24.4 25.1 32.5 29.3 
Total loans/GDP % 68 40.4 16.2 16.3 11.5 10 6.1 
Total time deposits/GDP % 10.6 9.3 5.2 8.9 7.0 5.4 5.4 
   
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
M2/GDP % 20.5 23.8 25.4 29.7 37.9 51.6  
Cash outside banks/ M2 % 33.7 39.6 39.0 33.0 25.7 18.7  
Total loans/GDP % 10.5 8.4 6.6 12.1 18.6 32.4  
Total time deposits/GDP % 5.5 5.5 6.4 9.1 13.4 21.0  
 
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
On the basis of the trends and changes in indicators of financial intermediation for the 
past ten years it is possible to distinguish three different periods of development for 
the banking system: 
• Transition to a market-based financial system: Evolution of institutional 
and policy reforms (1991-1993) 
• Period of banking crises following liberalization in the economy (1994-
1999) 
• Stabilization of the banking system since 1999. 
The main objectives of the financial sector reforms in Mongolia over the last decade 
were to institute a market-oriented financial system with improved monetary control 
and efficient financial intermediation. However, the reform objectives varied at 
different stages of the financial sector development.  
 
 15
 
1. Transition to a market based financial system: Evolution of institutional 
and policy reforms (1991-1993)  
Mongolia completed the first phase of banking sector reforms soon after it started on 
the path of market-based overhaul of the economy in 1990. These were confined to 
few immediate objectives of dismantling the monobanking system and establishing a 
two-tier banking system. The Bank of Mongolia was given considerable autonomy 
and mandate for maintaining monetary stability and supervising operations of 
commercial banks. Reforms began with the split-up of the state mono-bank into a 
central bank (Bank of Mongolia or BOM) and five commercial banks: the Investment 
and Technological Innovation (ITI) Bank; Trade and Development Bank (TDB); 
Ardyn (or Peoples’) Bank; Agricultural Bank (AB), and Insurance Bank. Banking 
legislation and regulations were prepared with donor support. In 1991, BOM also 
began licensing private banks. During the first half of the decade, ten small private 
commercial banks were licensed: Mongol Post; Cooperative, Exim /UB/; Industrial 
(later changed to Innovation); Business; Central Asia; Mercury; Selenge; Autoroad; 
and Bayanbogd.  
Under the centrally planned economy, holding foreign currency was prohibited and 
severely punished. Beginning almost right at the start of the transition in 1991, 
citizens and residents were allowed to hold foreign currency; foreign currency 
deposits and loans were instituted in commercial banks; the US dollar became a 
medium of exchange alongside the MNT; and capital account controls were 
eliminated. Until 1993, the official exchange rate was fixed and kept far below the 
market exchange rate. At the beginning of the transition, interest rate controls were 
lifted; however, bank interest rates lagged far behind inflation, which accelerated 
dramatically in the early 1990s. In 1993, the BOM instituted an interest rate floor on 
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commercial bank time deposits, to ensure that these interest rates would be positive in 
real terms.  
Unfortunately, in 1991 when first commercial banks started conducting their business 
the central bank lacked institutional infrastructure and experience to carry out 
monetary policy and system of bank supervision was absent. As a consequence, M2 
aggregate shot up by 77 percent in 1991, 32 percent in 1992, 227 percent in 1993 with 
concomitant rise in inflation of 325.5 in 1992, which has been worst inflation 
experience for single year in Mongolia. 
In addition, during these period some officials in the top management of the Bank of 
Mongolia have been implicated in unfortunate foreign exchange trading ending in 
substantial losses, which further hindered both prestige of new central bank and its 
operational stability. 
Until the introduction of the interbank clearing system, an abuse of "free borrowing of 
loan resources" had became a wide-spread practice among banks, in particular, the ITI 
and the Cooperative banks. The following strategically ill-fated deficiencies and 
mistakes have influenced the internal activities of commercial banks: an absence of 
understanding on asset and loan quality, accounting practices based on old, socialist 
time rules, lack of internal control procedures, competing with each other through 
loan making to attract new customers, total absence of loan appraisal techniques, and 
the establishment of many redundant branches in the countryside where the scope for 
profitable businesses was limited. On external side, lack of any real estate to be 
pledged against loan, "loan appraisal" based on a piece of paper called project, 
infancy of domestic and foreign trade, inflationary and exchange rate uncertainties, 
ongoing price liberalization process, vagueness of existing legal documents regulating 
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loan relations, unsatisfactory observance of few legal regulations all together have 
undermined the bank soundness and sustainability. 
Choosing bank customers by sectoral breakdown (the most visible example was 
Agricultural bank) was a basis for future bank-related troubles. The following 
measures have been taken in the context of financial reform to set up basic 
infrastructure to allow the central bank to conduct monetary policy: 
• In May 1991 the Banking law has been passed. 
• In second half of 1991, minimum reserve requirements and minimum deposit 
rates to be paid to saving accounts of individuals have been introduced. 
• By introduction of clearing system in August 1992, bank funds have been 
separated. 
• In September 1992 first prudential ratios have been enforced by the Bank of 
Mongolia. 
• In October 1992 the limits on central bank lending to commercial banks have 
been imposed, 
• In March 1993 general guidelines on bank onsite inspection and loan 
classification regulations have been adopted. 
• With introduction of floating exchange rate of Togrog in May 1993, the 
exchange rate determined by the market. 
• Adoption of new chart of bank accounts from January 1994.  
In addition, supervision system of commercial banks was taking a certain shape. 
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2. Period of banking crises following the liberalization in the economy 
(1994-1999) 
As a result of poor lending decisions made in 1991-1993, loan portfolio and 
consequently financial positions of commercial banks started to deteriorate from 1994. 
The banking crises in 1994-1999 came in two waves: the first wave in 1996 involving 
Ardyn and ITI banks, the second wave in 1998-1999, which resulted in restructuring 
of ITI, Reconstruction and Agricultural banks. The early signs of worries were forced 
acquisitions of the Mongolian cooperative bank by Ardyn and Selenge bank by ITI 
bank in 1994. These acquisitions were the first attempts by the Bank of Mongolia to 
restructure the bank sector. It provided emergency liquidity support to Ardyn and ITI 
banks amounting to MNT 5 billion or 2 percent of GDP. The BOM also placed two 
other insolvent banks (Mercury and Business) under conservatorship; however, the 
financial condition of banks, 95 percent of whose assets remained in the state hands, 
continued to deteriorate following a brief respite. Table 5 demonstrates a share of 
NPL within total loan portfolio for some of these troubled banks, that were later 
liquidated. 
Table 5. Mongolia: The NPL ratio of troubled banks /in billions of Togrogs/ 
  Insurance   Ardyn ITI                 Reconstruction   
  12/13/1996 12/13/1996 11/30/1999 11/30/1999 
NPL 4542 15992.1 14058.6 8012.7 
Total outstanding loans 5509.2 27699.6 14586.1 8012.7 
NPL ratio % 82.4 57.7 96.4 100 
 
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
By 1996 the Mongolian banking sector was fraught with significant level of financial 
disintermediation, with the banking sector being unable to support the real sector 
performance. Commercial banks had a loan to deposit ratio of more than 80 percent 
and, despite the short maturities of loans in general, were unable to maintain sufficient 
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liquidity to service the needs of their clients. The five largest banks, which controlled 
about 94 percent of the deposits, were regularly violating minimum reserve 
requirements, credit expansion and clearing liquidity norms stipulated by the BOM. 
Four of the five largest commercial banks and three of the smaller, privately owned 
ones were technically insolvent partly as a result of the carryover costs associated 
with inherited and directed loans on the part of State Banks but also the result of (i) 
poor management, (ii) weak regulatory/supervisory framework, and (iii) weak skills 
base. Accordingly, extensive reforms of the Bank of Mongolia’s regulatory and 
supervision functions and of commercial banking practices were urgently needed. 
Faced with a major banking crisis, a flight from the domestic currency (in 1994, about 
60 percent of the money supply was constituted by foreign currency) and acceleration 
of inflation, in December 1996, the Government launched a major restructuring of the 
banking system that was intended to eliminate insolvencies, restore public confidence 
and halt disintermediation. This effort was supported by the IMF (through ESAF), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), through its Financial Sector Policy Loan and two 
TA loans, and the World Bank (through its Banking and Enterprise Structural 
Adjustment Credit) and BELTAC. Two large insolvent banks -  Ardyn and Insurance 
with almost one-half of the bank assets were liquidated. The liabilities and performing 
assets of the defunct banks were transfered to two newly-created state banks. The 
Savings Bank inherited all household deposits and was designed only as a deposit 
taking institution. The Reconstruction bank inherited all performing assets and was 
designed as a specialized financial institution. The two banks also received interest 
bearing government bonds in lieu of the nonperforming assets of the liquidated 
entities. The Mongolian Asset Recovery Agency (MARA) was established with 
Government funding to take over these nonperforming assets.   
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The cost of the 1996-97 restructuring exercise as measured solely by issuance of 
Government restructuring bonds, amounted to MNT46 billion (7.8 percent of GDP). 
Other costs, such those relating to retrenchment, were not quantified. The largest of 
the remaining problem banks, Agricultural and ITI banks, were placed under 
rehabilitation through Memoranda of Understanding with the BOM. The following 
reform actions were taken place during this period: 
• A law on solvency was approved to regulate creditor and debtor relations 
under bankruptcy conditions and to institute the necessary procedures for 
rehabilitation or liquidation of insolvent entities. 
• A Credit Information Bureau was established to monitor loan defaulters. 
• The Banking law was amended to facilitate the collateralized lending, and 
• Loan loss classification norms were tightened. 
The second wave of the banking crisis started early in1998, as a result of the impact 
of the large external shock on the liquidity and profitability of major corporate clients; 
persistent managerial and governance problems in several big banks, political 
uncertainty, and inadequate supervision. The three banks, the Reconstruction Bank, 
ITI Bank, and Agricultural Bank, comprising 21.4 percent of total bank assets, 
became illiquid and insolvent. By end -1998, 41 percent of all bank loans were 
classified as nonperforming (up from 30 percent in 1997), of which 70 percent were 
concentrated in the three above-mentioned banks. The ratio of total bank assets to 
GDP continued to decrease in 1998, falling to 22 percent, compared to 23.6 percent in 
1997. (Table 6)  
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Table 6. Mongolia: Ratio of Total Bank Assets to GDP, 1997-1999 
  1997 1998 1999 
Banks total assets  196,279,783.90 179,483,901.30 200,193,013.80 
Banks total assets/GDP                   23.6                  22.0                   21.6  
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
Total loans of banks reached MNT 78.2 billion at the end of 1999, which is lower 
than MNT 8.1 billion from that of in 1998. While the bank loans constituted 50.9 
percent of total bank assets in 1996, the ratio declined to 38.0 percent in 1999. The 
classification of total loans by commercial banks is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Mongolia: Total loans of banks and their share, 1997-1999 (in thousands of 
MNT) 
  1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 
Trade and Development 
bank 13,934,374.8 32,758,670.8 24,299,086.1 27.0% 37.9% 31.1%
Golomt Bank 4,049,472.8 5,726,252.6 8,553,289.7 7.9% 6.6% 10.9%
Anod Bank     1,589,890.3 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Mongol Post Bank 887,791.5 1,399,087.1 3,897,122.9 1.7% 1.6% 5.0%
Ulaanbaatar City Bank   336,854.0 1,027,729.7 0.0% 0.4% 1.3%
Zoos Bank     895,822.9 0.0% 0.0% 1.1%
Agricultural Bank 4,078,585.0 4,809,755.0 3,528,108.0 7.9% 5.6% 4.5%
Erel Bank   1,605,040.0 2,195,178.7 0.0% 1.9% 2.8%
Transport Development 
Bank 558,608.2 1,057,888.0 774,508.9 1.1% 1.2% 1.0%
Innovation Bank 1,347,771.8 1,515,121.0 1,305,710.3 2.6% 1.8% 1.7%
Credit Bank   622,544.5 1,031,376.8 0.0% 0.7% 1.3%
Savings Bank 132,785.0 434,356.0 368,149.8 0.3% 0.5% 0.5%
Other banks 26,526,353.9 36,062,454.3 28,782,526.7 51.5% 41.8% 36.8%
TOTAL 51,515,743.0 86,328,023.3 78,248,500.8 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
In late 1998, the government carried out the following policy measures: 
• In September 1998 the Banking law was amended, significantly strengthening 
the regulatory framework for banks, the minimum capital requirement was 
raised from MNT 400 million to MNT 1 billion. The amended Banking law 
empowered the BOM to ensure improved banking governance (for instance, 
individuals of doubtful character can be prohibited from managerial and 
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board positions and BOM can convene shareholders’ meeting). It also 
substantially improved financial disclosure requirements and established the 
legal basis for bank audit standards. 
• An automatic loan rescheduling for defaulting borrowers were proscribed. 
• A new sector wide accounting standard, developed with ADB assistance, 
became effective. 
• In September the BOM withdrew the licenses of three small insolvent banks 
(Mongol Business, Mercury, and MM Invest banks) 
Early results of the reforms were encouraging. Bank deposits increased in 1997, 
signaling return of confidence and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
decreased to 28.8% at the end-1997 from 50.9% in 1996. (Table 8) 
Table 8. Mongolia: Nonperforming loans of the banking sector, 1992-1999 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total loans 19.1 31.6 52.8 62.7 64.8 50.4 85.6 77.5 
NPL 1.1 4.1 7.3 13.5 33 14.5 32.6 42.1 
NPL ratio % 5.8 13 13.8 21.3 50.9 28.8 38.1 54.3 
Source: The Bank of Mongolia 
 
Interest rates on deposits, which had been negative in real terms, to the detriment of 
price stability and financial intermediation, moved to positive levels. Bank 
profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy improved. A significant development was 
the emergence of a private bank, Golomt, as important and viable institution. Other 
fledging nonbank financial institutions, such as the stock exchange, securities firms 
and pawn shops, also emerged. Outside of the financial sector, remaining price 
controls on electricity, heating, water, and rents were largely eliminated. The tax 
system was overhauled to further curb price distortions and reduce the tax burden on 
the private sector: virtually all import duties were abolished, and corporate and 
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personal income taxes were simplified and marginal rates sharply reduced. Excise 
taxes were rationalized, government fees and charges were adjusted to improve cost 
recovery and efficiency, and a value added tax was introduced. Government's 
transfers to state enterprise sector was drastically curtailed hardening budget 
constraints. Privatization of non-financial enterprises also accelerated, yielding 
revenues equivalent to 1.5 of GDP in 1997 and 1.7% of GDP in 1998. 
Despite these improvements, however, several important weaknesses and institutional 
deficiencies persisted, which were exacerbated by the unfavourable external 
environment during 1998, and contributed to a serious deterioration of the financial 
condition of the banking system. A number of factors combined to a further 
weakening of the system. Briefly, these factors included, inter alia,  
• Delays in introducing and enforcing prudential regulations, 
• Weak management and governance of banks, 
• Limited skills in credit/risk management and weak  internal control, 
• Inadequacies in legal framework, particularly with regard to bank insolvency, 
conservatorship, receivership, and recovery of bad debts, 
• Prevailing default culture, 
• Delayed and inadequate bank supervision, and  
• Politicizing of banking policy issues. 
There was also the impact of large external shocks- including a sharp fall in 
commodity prices- on the profitability and cash flow of major corporate clients and 
emergence of serious managerial and governance problems at the Reconstruction 
Bank, which later was liquidated. The unsuccessful attempt at addressing the 
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prevailing default culture further eroded confidence in the banks. Further, as the fiscal 
position of the Government deteriorated, banking system’s claims on the Government 
accumulated, while the Government did not make full interest payments on these 
liabilities. The combination of these factors made it extremely difficult to secure 
additional capital in the banks, which was a critical component of the bank 
restructuring strategy. To amplify its problems, the banking sector was forced to 
reschedule an increasing portion of its loans, as its major clients were also under 
financial stress. Banks contributed to the unsupervised accumulation of problem loans 
as they concealed, to the extent possible, the quality and quantity of their problem 
loans failed to provision adequately against them.   
3. Stabilization of the banking sector since 1999 
Since liberalization, the banking sector has experienced a number of shocks and 
failures, most notably in 1994, 1996 and 1998. As discussed above the upheavals 
resulted in combinations of liquidations, rehabilitations and forced consolidations, 
some of which involved some of the largest institutions. These restructuring of the 
sector were accompanied also by substantial institutional, regulatory and policy 
reforms, implemented with strong financial and technical support from donor 
organizations. The stabilization of the banking sector has been observed since late 
1999 as the confidence in the system was restored. (Box 1) The positive 
improvements within the banking system during this period can be attributed to the 
following factors: 
• Lessons and experiences of past two periods have been very valuable. 
• With stabilization of the banking system, confidence of the public and 
entrepreneurs towards banks has greatly increased bringing funds in a form of 
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current accounts, time deposits into banks which, in turn, has allowed banks to 
significantly increase their lending reviving channels of financial 
intermediation. 
• Since 1999 MNT exchange rate vis-a-vis US dollar has been stable and 
inflation has been contained at the predictable levels. 
• Competition within the financial sector received a substantial boost; in 2001 
alone 2 banks with domestic capital /Inter, Capitron/, branch of foreign bank 
/Menatep SP/, bank with mixed domestic and foreign funding /XAS/ and 
NBFI with large foreign investment /Chingis Haan NBFI/ were established 
with total of 22.7 billion Togrogs of capital injection. 
• Activity of the Agricultural bank with extensive rural branch network has been 
revived.  
• Numerous NBFIs, Agricultural and HAS banks started working with 
microlenders which have been in the past largely ignored by bigger banks. 
• Principal amendments concerning legal provisions on lending and loan 
collateral have been approved by Parliament in early-2001. 
• The government direct intervention in resource allocation through directed 
credits were completely eliminated.  
• The management and internal supervision of the banks has improved and there 
was strengthening of activities of independent internal audit units. 
• Slow evolution of the Bank of Mongolia's supervision geared towards 
preventive risk evaluation. 
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With institutional structure of the banking system being set up, the Bank of Mongolia 
has approved principal document titled "Medium term strategy of the financial system 
development" in early 2000. 
In 2000 the World Bank approved the Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) to 
support a further round of financial sector reforms based on a detailed financial sector 
review and curtailing the amount of public funds involved. Initiatives included 
privatizing the largest bank and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework.  
A summary of the main reforms in the financial sector and of other economic reforms 
is presented in Table 9.  
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BOX 1. The structure of the financial sector.  
 
An extremely low intermediation level characterizes Mongolia’s financial sector. Net banking 
system assets accounted for 20 percent of GDP and the ratio of private credits to GDP was only 4 
percent by end-2000, with no penetration by foreign banks and very high state participation. Cross-
country evidence indicates that opening domestic financial markets to foreign financial institutions 
brings significant increases in stability and efficiency (Litan et al., 2001). Entry by foreign banks 
tends to aid diversification of domestic risks, enhance competition and efficiency, and lower moral 
hazard. 
 
The banking sector is highly concentrated. As of the end of 2001, 16 banks and 28 non-bank 
financial institutions were providing banking services through their 538 offices (105 branches, 419 
sub-branches, & 13 cash offices) located in all aimags of the country. At the aimag and soum level 
12 banks have 436 representative offices, which is 65 offices more than in 2000. Rural offices 
represent more than 80 percent of all banking offices. This reflects lack of a sound and safe multi-
tiered financial service network. 
 
During 2001, total assets of all banks increased dramatically and a ratio of M2 to GDP, which as an 
indicator to determine scope of financial intermediation, increased by 4.3 percentage points to 29.7 
percent compared with 2000. Reduction of interest rates in international markets, attendant 
improvements in the domestic financial market and a rise in the deposit base has been facilitating 
lending activity of banks.  
 
The central bank has continued to strengthen its prudential guidelines for banks, raising the 
minimum capital requirement for new banks to MNT 4 billion (approximately US$4 million) on 
July 1, 2001.  
 
16 banks were conducting operations in the banking sector, of which 2 banks were state owned, 4 
banks had state participation in their equity funds, and 10 banks were owned by the private sector. 
As of the end of 2000, 69.9 percent of all deposits, 81.7 percent of all current accounts, and 91 
percent of government funds were concentrated in the partial and fully state owned banks. As a 
result of competitive pressure from private banks these ratios were decreased to 58.6, 77.9, and 
89.4 percent respectively thereby increasing the market share of the later. Total assets increased by 
47.4 percent or by MNT 107 billion representing 29.4 percent of GDP. This massive growth was 
associated with the expansion of current accounts, deposits, government funds and equity capital.  
 
Total loans outstanding reached MNT 135.1 billion, accompanied by an increase in public and 
private sector lending of 68 percent and 250 percent respectively. This shows the increasing role of 
banks in financing in the real economy and a deepening of financial intermediation. In other words, 
during previous years, liquid and foreign assets represented the major share of total assets while the 
share of domestic credit was less than 25 percent. This picture has changed, as seen by the share of 
loans at the end of 2000, which soared to 40 percent, with a tentative pressure for further rise.  
Regardless of the tremendous growth in loans outstanding, BOM bills still remains only a small 
portion of total assets in the banking system, thereby supporting a liquidity ratio that has stayed 
above the required minimum and implying the possibility for further increases in financial 
intermediation through monetary policy instruments.  
 
In 1998, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was 38.1 percent, in 1999 -54.3 percent, 
and in 2000 - 23.8 percent, while in 2001 it decreased by 15.7 percentage points to 8.1 percent. 
Most loans classified as non-performing were granted before 1999-2000. Progress in the recovery 
of loans has been assisted by improvements in the banks' credit policies and amendments in 
legislation which have helped mitigate credit risks.  
 
Source: The Bank of Mongolia. 
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Table 9. Mongolia: Main financial and economic reforms 
Financial sector reforms  
Interest rate 
liberalization 
A major liberalization of interest rate was announced in September 1991, 
when the BOM sharply increased its lending rate to commercial banks 
and signaled its intention to adjust the rate periodically. 
Capital account 
liberalization 
Liberalized in 1991 
Indirect mon.pol. 
instruments 
The role of indirect instruments in regulating credit expansion increased 
with the introduction of central bank bills in November 1993. 
Money market 
development 
At early stages of development 
Reserve requirement Early steps to develop indirect monetary management included the 
introduction of reserve requirements in September 1991. 
Central bank 
independence 
Central bank Law was adopted in 1992 
Prudential regulation In September 1992 first prudential ratios have been enforced by the Bank 
of Mongolia 
Bank supervision Initial steps were taken in 1992 by the BOM 
Restructuring Started early 1994 (the BOM merged the insolvent Cooperative Bank 
with Ardyn and Selenge Bank with ITI)   
Privatization The first privatization took place in September 2002. (Trade and 
Development Bank) 
Other financial sector 
reforms 
In 1996 the Mongolian Asset Recovery Agency (MARA) was established 
with Government funding to take over nonperforming assets. The 
Mongolian Stock Exchange was also established. 
  
Other economic reforms  
Fiscal reforms The first Budget Law was approved in conjunction with the 1993 budget, 
together with the Constitution and the General Tax law, clarified the 
sources of revenues accruing to the central and local governments. The 
procedures for cash management were improved, a treasury function and 
debt registry were introduced, a monthly fiscal reporting system in line 
with standard IMF classifications was created. 
Privatization of state 
enterprises 
The privatization program was launched in July 1991 with the objective 
of selling 44 percent of state-owned assets by means of vouchers that 
were distributed to the entire population. 
Price liberalization Started in early 1991 with liberalization of prices on agricultural outputs.  
Trade reform In early 1990s the trade liberalization was accelerated through the 
abolition of state orders for exports and imports by allowing the private 
sector to purchase the most commodities for export, except for meat and 
live animals, at freely determined prices. As of 1990, the monopoly of 
state trading corporations over foreign trade was abolished. 
Exchange rate regime A floating exchange rate regime was adopted in May 1993. 
External debt A decision was made by the countries of the former CMEA to settle on a 
bilateral basis in transferable rubles mutual demands and obligations.  
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4. Lessons from Past Reform Efforts 
The assessment in the previous section raises questions about the lessons that can be 
drawn from past efforts to reform the financial system in the transition to a market-
oriented economy. There are several areas where past reforms have been deficient. 
These deficiencies need to be carefully taken into account in designing a new strategy 
for future reforms. 
Weaknesses in the essential building blocks to support a market based financial 
system. These include absence of requisite banking skills, weaknesses in the legal 
framework to support and enforce financial contracts, and lack of transparency about 
the financial health of firms and banks due to under-developed accounting and 
auditing standards. While attempts have been made to strengthen banking skills with 
technical assistance support from donors, the design of the reforms program has not 
taken adequate account of the severe shortage of skills. The deficiencies in other 
fundamental building blocks are equally serious. There are ambiguities and gaps in 
the legislation relating to the protection of parties to financial contracts, including 
laws pertaining to the transfer of private property rights. Unless these deficiencies in 
the administration and enforcement of the law are not addressed, they will undermine 
the basis on which sound banking decisions can be made. Some banking decisions 
also require transparency about the financial health of firms. It is difficult to make an 
assessment without help of audited financial statements that can be relied upon. This 
has not been possible in the early stages of development and so banks boils down to 
making decisions based on personal references, physical checks etc. These are 
characteristics which are more akin to banking by informal lenders and cannot form 
the basis of a modern efficient market based banking system. While accounting and 
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auditing standards are being strengthened, it would be a mistake to assume that the 
banking system can develop without a coordinated investment in improving the 
standards of accounting and auditing. 
Lack of a credible Government committed to honor contracts and to ensure 
protection of private rights. A necessary condition for developing well-functioning 
markets is the establishment of credible commitments on the part of the Government 
to honor contracts. Payment arrears by the Government, failure to fulfill its 
obligations to service debt, and high profile policy reversals after the private sector 
had made investments signaled to the public that the Government is not committed to 
ensure protection of private rights. In such a context, financial liberalization is likely 
to lead to disastrous results, as has been demonstrated in many countries undergoing a 
transition to a market based economy.  
Inappropriate sequencing of reforms. Policy reform measures to liberalize interest 
rates, entry of private banks, and the capital account of balance of payments were 
introduced before the preconditions for their successful implementation had been 
attained including: (i) development of the essential building blocks; (ii) an effective 
regulatory framework and the capacity to supervise the banking system and enforce 
the regulatory framework; and (iii) effective steps towards macroeconomic stability 
including control of the budget deficit, which is particularly important for successful 
liberalization of the capital account but applies more generally to reduce the risk of 
the banking system being used as a tool for financing government expenditures.  
The pervasive involvement of the state in the allocation of financial resources. A 
major anomaly in the process of liberalization has been the extensive government 
equity holding of commercial banking institutions. Banks which are wholly or partly 
owned by the Government account for 90 percent of the assets of the banking system. 
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This dominance of the system by the government is incompatible with the 
development of a banking system where the Government’s role in the allocation of 
resources is to be replaced by the market. It is possible for the conflict inherent in the 
government owning banks that it also supervises to be resolved through adequate 
corporate governance. In most developing countries state ownership of the banking 
sector has been characterized by inefficiency. In Mongolia, all the banks of any 
significant size have been state owned. It is also notable that in 1996, restructuring of 
the banking system involved the closure of two state-owned banks – Savings Banks 
and Restructuring Bank.   
CHAPTER FOUR. FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS EXPERIENCE 
1. Evidence and Lessons from Other Transition Countries 
All the former centrally planned economies in transition to a market based financial 
system inherited similar financial structures. Their common features were absence of 
financial markets and irrelevance of financial variables for the real economy, 
especially the enterprise sector. All have endured large structural shocks, in the form 
of price liberalization, the creation of markets, and elimination of soft budget 
constraints liberalized or privatized previously state-run enterprises. All have needed 
also to create a credit system, hopefully achieving a balance between providing 
liquidity to viable firms while maintaining incentives for efficient behavior. In this 
context, all financial intermediaries inevitably have been subject to high risks and 
limited efficiency gains. Mongolia’s financial sector reform experience can be 
compared with that of other transition countries, especially those in the 
Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS). (Table 10) 
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Table 10. Comparative Data on the Structure of Banking System 
 Number 
of Banks 
Number of 
SOCBs 
% share of 
assets of top 
5 banks 
M2/GDP 
(%) 
Currency/ 
M2 
(%) 
Number of 
Banks per 
100.000 
inhabitants 1/
Albania 8 3 100 45 37  
Armenia 37 5 85 23 42 9 
Azerbaijan 197 4 n.a. 26 64 21 
Belarus 52 7 75 11 25 4 
Bulgaria 34 7 90 91 15 5 
China 19 7 90 91 15  
Croatia 47 19 70 21 24 12 
Czech Rep. 58 1 69 74 10 4 
Estonia 16 1 70 20 44 11 
Georgia 203 5 90 3 56 20 
Hungary 41 3 63 43 26 4 
Kazakhstan 167 4 90 11 58 8 
Kyrgyz Rep. 17 3 90 11 78  
Latvia 40 3 55 30 43 17 
Lithuania 27 3 70 17 42 4 
Macedonia 40 3 97 25 22 4 
Moldova 27 4 85 8 51  
Mongolia 2/ 16 4 84 19 39 1 
Poland 73 5 66 31 26 2 
Romania 28 7 74 15 30 1 
Russia 2561 1 33 15 42 14 
Slovak Rep. 30 2 79 67 13 4 
Slovenia 34 2 70 37 10 19 
Tajikstan 14 14 90 42 58  
Turkmenistan 21 11 90 13 47  
Ukraine 217 2 70 16 37  
Uzbekistan 35 29 95 79 26  
Vietnam 62 4 90 22 58  
Comparator countries 3/ 
United Kingdom 530  29  3  
France 419  43  6  
Spain 154  39  13  
Greece 154  63  17  
Denmark 124  77  4  
Turkey 68  45  10  
Venezuela 41  n.a.  9  
Argentina 166  40  22  
Developed 
countries 
192  50  9  
Notes: 1/ Average for 1993-1997 
2/ All data for Mongolia refer to December 2001. Data for the other transition countries are for mid 
1995 
3/ Data for OECD countries refer to 1992. 
 
Before discussing possible ways forward for Mongolia, it is helpful to view its 
difficulties confronted in the transition process in the context of lessons from these 
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transition experiences. Recent research highlights both a number of common 
outcomes and a number of important policy pointers. The outcomes include: 
• Low level of financial intermediation: with few exceptions previously 
centrally planned economies display a much lower degree of financial 
deepening, even after several years, than market economies at similar levels of 
per capita income. 
• A prevalence of loosely-supervised banks created or controlled by domestic 
enterprises, and for whom banks became captive lenders, leading to soft 
budget constraints and higher default risks. 
• Over-banked markets, despite recurrent consolidations and liquidations of 
failed banks. 
• A vicious cycle of high real interest rates, accompanied by large spreads 
between lending and deposit rates, and rising levels of non-performing loans. 
• “Hiding” of persistent bad debt problems behind ad hoc solutions, leading 
banks to seek to regroup their losses through even higher spreads and self-
defeating purchases of government bonds. 
• Absence of explicit deposit insurance schemes, leaving banks more at risk of 
bank runs. 
While there are some common features, two quite different solutions can be detected 
between the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the former Soviet 
Union/ Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries which display much 
lower money to GDP. The strategies adopted broadly differed between those countries 
that had already undergone partial processes of decentralization and reform – mainly 
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the CEE countries – and those that had not – mainly CIS countries. The difference in 
initial conditions at transition appears significant, in that the partial liberalization 
process at least created a minimal set of market institutions that proved critical for the 
success of full-pledged market reforms. Consequently the development of well-
functioning trade-credit markets in countries like Hungary and Poland, contrasted 
with the explosion of inter-enterprise arrears and barter in CIS countries.  Arguably, 
the different starting points also allowed the CEE-type countries to pursue a more 
gradual and cautious approach to transition, while the CIS-type countries were forced 
or induced into more rapid financial liberalization. But it can also be argued that the 
rapid liberalization in the latter countries increased their vulnerability to financial 
crisis. It might not be fair to claim that these policies – such as allowing unregulated 
entry of banks and totally deregulating the capital account of the balance of payments 
– were the cause of financial crises. The financial liberalization strategies followed by 
the relatively “advanced” CEE-type reformers differed from those of the CIS-type in 
several ways which may have contributed to the development of different degrees of 
systemic risk. First, the CEE-type countries adopted a cautious approach to bank entry 
and lending to liberalized domestic firms. By contrast, the CIS-type typically allowed 
many more banks to be created by, and to lend to, domestic enterprises and – despite 
some subsequent consolidations and liquidations – permitted their markets to become 
“over-banked”. Thus, whereas Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics 
averaged 4 banks per 100.000 inhabitants in 1993-1997, many CIS type countries had 
between 10 and 20 banks per 100.000 inhabitants. Moreover, loosely-supervised CIS 
banks, controlled by firms, led to captive loan markets for the firms, softer budget 
constraints and higher default risks. In the “advanced” countries, however, credit for 
domestic firms, other than unreformed state-owned enterprises (like utilities), was 
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limited, forcing firms to be more reliant on self-financing. The constrained 
availability of bank credit led to the growth of the private trade-credit markets, which 
allowed firms to economize on their cash holdings, thereby freeing up more resources 
for self-financing – in social terms, a much less costly mechanism than default for 
compensating for the lack of bank credit. 
Second, CIS-type countries were more prone to “hiding” bad-debt problems behind ad 
hoc solutions, whereas CEE-types tended to tackle them through comprehensive re-
capitalization policies. The result was a greater tendency to allow banks in CIS-type 
economies to try to recoup their losses through much higher spreads between lending 
and deposit rates and through purchase of government bonds – a self-defeating 
strategy, since the asset base tends to shrink and the composition of loan portfolios 
tend to worsen, as a result of adverse selection. Third, CEE-type countries typically 
were much slower to liberalize their capital accounts, and particularly to retain 
controls on portfolio investments – a practice that (at least in the case of Hungary, not 
Czech Republic) did not seem to inhibit FDI flows, interfere with banking activities or 
general macroeconomic instability. And fourth, CEE-type reformers were much more 
likely to adopt explicit deposit insurance schemes, in the absence of which – despite 
reduced moral hazard – banks in CIS type economies were more at risk of bank runs. 
These “qualitatively” different outcomes and behavior patterns clearly warrant 
explanation. The possibility that they can be explained away by the hyperinflation, 
which affected many CIS-type economies at the start of transition, can be discounted, 
partly because several of the CEE-type countries also experienced hyperinflation, and 
partly because many CIS-type countries did not enjoy much subsequent re-
monetization, despite achieving lower inflation rates than some of the “advanced” 
reformers. Low inflation therefore, is not a sufficient condition for getting these 
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economies out of their “low level of monetization” situation, though it is a necessary 
one. A more satisfactory explanation is that the different behavior patterns constitute 
rational responses, at the microeconomic level, to the different conditions obtaining in 
two types of transition countries. In general terms, as is well known, an individual 
borrower will opt for default when the benefits of doing so – the extra liquidity gained 
– exceed the cost. It can be shown, however, that generalized default can emerge as a 
widespread and persistent phenomenon when institutional factors – such as weak 
bankruptcy procedures and high expectations of bail-out – systematically reduce the 
costs of continuing arrears. This could well explain the increased tendency to default 
in those transition economies in which the effective risk of bankruptcy is reduced. 
Escape from such a “trap” will require not only the usual macroeconomic measures to 
restore financial stability, but also remedies for the institutional shortcomings.  
2. Implications for Mongolia 
Since 1990, Mongolia has made considerable strides, in often, difficult domestic and 
external circumstances, in transforming its economy to a market one. The strategy 
pursued to date has been accompanied by a sustained recovery of economic activity 
since 1993 with slight fluctuations due to external developments and weather related 
conditions. The magnitude of the financial crises occured in the past however, 
underscored two major shortcomings. First, all of Mongolia's efforts to reform the 
financial system have failed to eliminate the conditions that seemingly predispose the 
system to revert to recurrent states of crisis. Second, failure of the financial system 
was a major drag on the economy, holding back the rate of development and 
progressive improvements in living standards.  
Experiences of transition economies show a number of challenges that should be 
addressed: absence of well-functioning capital and private credit markets, the 
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perpetuation of inefficient and crisis prone financial institutions, prevalence of 
financial indiscipline, including growth of involuntary credit in the form of payment 
arrears etc.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The development of an efficient and viable banking sector is necessary to support 
sustainable economic growth in Mongolia. Recognizing the importance of this sector 
many international financial organizations have been working closely to assist 
Mongolia in overcoming the structural problems and to accelerate the process of 
building a stable and efficient financial sector in Mongolia. 
The experiences with financial sector reforms provide a number of important lessons. 
First, financial sector reforms require that mutually supporting reforms be undertaken 
in a number of areas – monetary and exchange, prudential, and structural. Reforms to 
certain sectors, such as monetary and exchange systems, can perform a critical 
catalytic function and help to provide momentum to the reform process. However, 
these reforms need to be concomitant with the strengthening of institutional structure 
to ensure that the liberalizations induce the appropriate responses in terms of resource 
mobilization and allocation and help to avoid banking crises. Banking sector 
weaknesses should be addressed at an early stage in the reforms through, among other 
things, implementation of a critical mass of accounting rules, prudential norms, 
supervisory procedures and bank restructuring. The parallel development of critical 
money, exchange, and capital market institutional instruments should facilitate money 
and exchange system reforms. These institution building reforms can thus promote 
more efficient credit and foreign exchange allocation and support macroeconomic 
adjustment by safeguarding against a financial crisis, and by allowing for a more rapid 
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introduction of indirect and more efficient monetary instruments, as well as external 
liberalization.  
The lessons from experience of other transition economies indicate that Mongolia’s 
experience may replicate that of other transition economies that liberalized their 
financial sectors too rapidly and before the pre-conditions for a successful 
liberalization had been attained. In Mongolia’s case it also appears that the rapid 
liberalization of the financial sector may have benefited the economy but it also been 
costly given the weaknesses in basic infrastructure, such as banking skills, poor rules 
of disclosure, and weak accounting and auditing standards. 
While drawing on lessons from the past, the strategy to accelerate the construction of 
a sound and efficient financial system should entail the following aspects: 
• In view of the characteristics of Mongolia as a small economy, dependent on 
the exports of a few commodities and highly vulnerable to terms trade shocks, 
the reform and the development of the financial sector needs to be closely 
coordinated with other economic reforms, including fiscal reforms and the 
national development strategy and programs to diversify the economy to 
reduce the risks facing the real and financial sectors. 
• Facilitate the development of sustainable rural financial financial institutions 
and markets to provide payment systems and banking services appropriate to 
conditions existing in sparsely populated such as Mongolia and which can 
respond flexibly to on-going structural changes in the economy. A high 
priority needs to be given to further develop and establish financial network in 
rural areas to maintain financial services.  
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• Consolidate the banking system to enhance effective competition by the 
emergence of a relatively small number of sound banks and encourage 
international banks to take an equity stake in domestic banks or open branches 
in Mongolia, to lower the cost of intermediation and with it real interest rates, 
to improve governance with bank privatization and set the stage for the 
development of money markets. 
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